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DATE 11/14/85  
DOC NO Alam 85-10118C  
OCR CYS 2  
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**DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE**

**OCTOBER 1985**

**CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #27**

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**PERSPECTIVE**

In mid-October, the Sandinistas expanded their three-year old state of emergency, providing a legal framework to tighten controls over opponents who have become increasingly outspoken. The new restrictions include broadened press censorship, limits on public assemblies and internal travel, and bans on political organizing by the opposition parties. The Sandinistas have used the war to justify the decree, stating that it is aimed solely at counter-revolutionaries. The pro-regime press has emphasized the rights still in force--primarily those pertaining to criminal judicial procedures--and has tried to demonstrate that the restrictions have impacted little on daily life.

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US Embassy reporting suggests that the Catholic Church hierarchy's increasingly intense attacks on the regime precipitated the decree. Cardinal Obando had been drawing large crowds during his domestic tour and many of his masses were only thinly veiled anti-government rallies, according to US Embassy observers. A series of other incidents--including the government's decision to renege on promises not to draft seminarians and threats to expel foreign priests who supported Obando--further heightened tensions. Just before issuing the decree, the regime confiscated the first issue of a Church-sponsored newsletter, comprised primarily of anti-government articles,

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In the wake of the decree, the Sandinistas occupied the curia offices and Interior Minister Borge summoned the Cardinal to his office for questioning about the Church's ties to the opposition political parties. The pro-regime press

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This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains information available as of 3 November 1985. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division,

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[redacted]

also issued what the US Embassy calls unprecedented attacks on Obando, accusing him of supporting the insurgency. Despite these attacks, the Church has continued to criticize regime policies. The Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference issued a mildly defiant communique reiterating calls for a national dialogue to include the armed insurgents. In addition, the Cardinal defied the government's requirement that he obtain permission for outdoor masses, and, according to the US Embassy, his first mass following the decree attracted nearly 6,000 worshippers. [redacted]

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The regime intensified attacks on civilian opponents as well. The press reports that the Sandinistas warned two leaders of the Democratic Coordinating Board, the main opposition coalition, not to publish any protests or analyses of the government decree. At least one member political party was also warned not to publish its newsletter. In addition, in late October security officials raided the offices of an independent labor federation and arrested three union leaders for criticizing the emergency decree, according to press reports. The Sandinistas also continued to harass some private sector leaders. [redacted]

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The Sandinistas' Western supporters expressed chagrin over the emergency decree, but appear disinclined to criticize the regime harshly. French President Mitterand, for example, "lamented" the tough measures, but also criticized US policy in Central America. The Swedes also criticized the restrictions, but the US Embassy in Stockholm reports no plans for a reduction in Swedish economic assistance. [redacted]

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The state-of-emergency, in our view, demonstrates the heightened sensitivity of the regime to internal criticism. While it gives the Sandinistas broad powers to control internal dissent, we believe they will continue their policy of selective implementation to avoid charges that they intend to eliminate the entire opposition. Managua probably calculates that this strategy will also defuse broad popular resistance to the law and induce key leaders to go into exile without prompting a damaging mass exit. The Church, as the regime's most formidable opponent, will remain its primary target, in our view. The Cardinal is likely to be able to defy some of the restrictions, but the regime has already used the travel ban to limit attendance at his masses. More vulnerable second echelon clerical and lay officials could also pay the price for Obando's resistance. They could be detained and interrogated by the security services or, in the case of foreign priests, be expelled by the government. The government suspended the hierarchy's radio broadcasts for two days in late October, and publishing facilities could also be closed down permanently. The inability to meet and publish communiques will further isolate and fragment the political opposition, in our view. Urban-based opposition political parties and labor unions, for example, will probably have difficulty continuing only recently renewed organizing efforts outside the cities. [redacted]

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Western and Latin American countries will probably remain critical of the state of emergency, but will likely keep their displeasure out of the public eye. The Sandinistas probably believe they are more vulnerable to internal dissent

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[redacted]

than foreign opprobrium and that the criticism will likely have little lasting impact on their international standing. Managua probably calculates that its supporters in the West, while disapproving, will not abandon the regime out of fear that it would encourage expanded US military pressures against Nicaragua. Further, the Sandinistas are probably confident that Soviet and Bloc economic assistance would limit the impact of any cuts in aid by Western democracies. In addition, there are thus far no indications that the state of emergency has become an issue in the Contadora negotiations. [redacted]

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
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**NICARAGUA: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC EVENTS**

The Sandinistas focused their military resources on attempting to bottle up the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) inside Honduras



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Sandinistas had pulled virtually all heavy artillery away from the northernmost areas of Nueva Segovia Department, apparently to cover the approaches to Esteli. Vulnerability to Honduran airstrikes may also have contributed to the decision.



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
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The Sandinistas also intensified their technical collection effort against the insurgents. Overhead photography revealed the establishment of another high frequency/direction finding installation in Managua, the sixth countrywide, further enhancing their ability to identify and locate rebel locations.




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Meanwhile, Nicaragua received several donations of grains and other commodities in short supply this month from the Soviet Union, according to the US Embassy. The Embassy also reported that manpower shortages and inadequate prices led to a poor rice harvest, which is compounding other grain shortages in local



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[REDACTED]

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stores. The Sandinistas confiscated some private rice farmers harvests recently, blaming them for the shortfalls. [REDACTED]

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### EL SALVADOR

San Salvador remained preoccupied throughout October with negotiations to win the release of President Duarte's daughter, kidnaped 10 September. US Embassy reporting indicated that the government ground to a standstill and that attention was deflected from all other issues, including the economy. Although Duarte received credit for securing the freedom of the hostage mayors as well as his daughter on 24 October, criticism of his handling of the affair continues. Duarte appears to recognize that he has been hurt politically by the kidnaping and began moving quickly to restore his image as a strong leader and to mend fences with the military. [REDACTED]

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The President came under fire from some military officers and civilian opposition leaders for being too involved in the negotiations, too willing to sacrifice national interests for personal reasons, and for setting a precedent that could encourage other kidnapings. Some concern from within Duarte's own administration also surfaced that the protracted negotiations allowed the rebels to resurrect El Salvador's checkered human rights record, according to the US Embassy. Chief of the Armed Forces Joint Staff General Blandon said that the level of discontent in the military was at its highest following the prisoner exchange in part because rebels had been freed to return to the field and take up arms. [REDACTED]

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In the wake of the prisoner exchange, Duarte met with senior military commanders and influential civilians and announced plans to create a National Security Council to better coordinate counterinsurgency efforts. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Duarte also went ahead with his visit to the US in an effort to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] 25X1

secure additional economic and military aid and publicly win Washington's renewed support for his government. [REDACTED] 25X1

In our judgment, the insurgents see recent events as a net plus and are likely to continue to execute actions that will keep their cause in the public eye. In addition to the kidnaping, the insurgents attacked the military training center at La Union on 11 October. The attack was the largest guerrilla military operation in more than a year and resulted in over 40 Salvadoran soldiers killed and some 75 wounded. The guerrillas, however, publicly called the attack a "failure," since no US military advisers were killed. [REDACTED] 25X1

Later in the month--and only 48 hours after the release of Duarte's daughter--a senior Air Force officer who recently had served as head of the President's personal security force was kidnaped. The FMLN appears responsible but no group had issued demands for the victim's release by month's end. [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] 25X1

### PANAMA

Opposition elements are keeping the murder of Hugo Spadafora in the public arena despite efforts by General Noriega and the military to discourage them. In late October, the US Embassy reported that a rally calling for a full investigation of the killing drew an enthusiastic crowd and the Spadafora family and supporters have undertaken a series of protest activities that could culminate in a general strike if a commission is not created. Opposition newspapers have also been keeping the case on the front page. In addition, the Catholic Church is taking an increasingly vocal position, permitting demonstrations at the Papal Nuncio's residence, sponsoring religious activities in support of Spadafora's family, and condemning the military for accusing its critics of sedition. Meanwhile, the military leadership has tried to implement a limited form of media repression by demanding a stop to criticism of the Defense Forces and discussion of the murder case. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] President Delvalle, demonstrating his allegiance to the military, has publicly refused to name a special commission on the grounds that it would be unconstitutional although, according to the US Embassy, prominent lawyers argue otherwise. [REDACTED] 25X1

On the economic front, President Delvalle has taken positions designed to bolster his political base. He boosted price subsidies on selected consumer staples and indicated a disinclination to adopt austerity measures sought by international bankers, according to US Embassy reports. Although commercial banks have decided to reschedule Panama's debt, which will enable the government to meet its 1985 fiscal requirements, a longer term economic policy to respond to international lender demands remains undefined. [REDACTED] 25X1

Since Barletta's ouster, the Defense Forces and leftists in the pro-government party have moved toward a mutually beneficial alliance. [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] Noriega has encouraged pro-government statements by leftist leaders who have touted the Torrijos populist economic model and publicly lauded the Defense Chief. [REDACTED] members of the party's left wing 25X1



25X1

have already been rewarded with important second-echelon government posts. We believe that Noriega's use of the left in the current crisis reflects his efforts to appeal to nationalist interests in a bid for a stronger political base. [REDACTED]

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### GUATEMALA

The strong showing by centrist parties in the election on 3 November and the impartial role of the military in the voting process suggest that Guatemala's transition to civilian rule remains on track. The center-leftist Christian Democratic Party and the National Centrist Union--the two top vote-getters--will face a presidential runoff on 8 December. Moderate parties will form a majority in the new Congress, although the rightists may remain a strong minority. Preliminary reporting from the US Embassy indicates that the election was conducted honestly and efficiently. [REDACTED]

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The election marked the end of a campaign which largely ignored substantive issues and focused on personalities. Despite seriously worsening economic conditions, none of the 14 competing parties went beyond offering vague economic panaceas. Christian Democratic Party leader Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo--a moderate center-leftist who has taken care to cultivate good relations with the military--reportedly favors moderate economic reforms, but is unlikely to implement more extensive and politically risky austerity measures at least in the near term, according to the US Embassy. Jorge Carpio Nicolle of the National Centrist Union--a progressive moderate with no coherent economic platform--promised to cut the country's unemployment rate by creating over 250,000 new jobs, but failed to say how he would fund the increase. US Embassy reporting indicated that both frontrunners favor closer ties to the US and are counting on large infusions of economic and military aid after the new government takes office in January. [REDACTED]

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For its part, the armed forces largely remained above the partisan political fray and stuck to its refusal to endorse a specific candidate. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] in an effort to counter allegations of interference. On the economic front, the government continued to pursue temporary measures to stave off even more rapid economic decline. Meija, for example, according to US Embassy sources, received assurances from Venezuela and Mexico that they would meet petroleum needs at least through January. [REDACTED]

Recent guerrilla actions--designed in part to disrupt elections--were confined largely to hit-and-run tactics, roadblocks and propaganda. The military responded aggressively and suffered a number of casualties. In clashes in western departments the US Defense Attache reported that two officers and at least six soldiers died in a mid-October ambush in El Quiche Department. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In addition, rebels in Suchitepequez Department mined an airstrip that caused a plane carrying a Norwegian official and three other passengers to explode when it landed. [REDACTED] Meanwhile, guerrillas in the Peten burned the Ocultan oil camp and continued to occupy farms and distribute propaganda. Despite an increase in rebel activity, the guerrillas have fallen short of their announced goal of disrupting the elections. Nevertheless, they are likely to

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[redacted] 25X1

continue their efforts during the runoff and the period prior to the inauguration of the new regime. [redacted] 25X1

### HONDURAS

The military--with strong public backing--thwarted yet another attempt by lameduck President Suazo to scuttle elections scheduled for 24 November. In his latest maneuver, Suazo sought legislative approval to cancel elections, convert Congress into a Constituent Assembly, and extend his term for two years, according to the US Embassy. [redacted] the high command responded strongly by first applying private pressure on individual Congressmen, then publicly threatening to arrest the sponsors of the bill, and finally, if necessary, by planning to replace Suazo with a civilian-military junta. Public opinion reportedly ran strongly in favor of the military's position, according to the US Embassy. The President's long record of political intrigue indicates that he probably cannot be dissuaded from trying again to disrupt elections, but we believe the armed forces' decisive handling of this latest challenge increases the chances of smooth elections in November. [redacted] 25X1

Nevertheless, complex and confusing election rules could be pushing Honduras toward post-election problems. [redacted] 25X1

many military officers prefer National Party candidate Rafael Callejas over Liberal Party frontrunner Jose Azcona. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] current election laws--under which each party can run several candidates and the leading candidate from the party with the most votes wins--could give Azcona a victory even if Callejas is the top individual vote-getter. Under this scenario, Callejas would likely ask the Supreme Court to rule whether the law violates constitutional provisions for direct elections by simple majority, and the armed forces--which helped craft the law last spring--would be forced to choose between supporting Callejas or abiding by the electoral procedures they designed. Such a debate, in our view, could offer Suazo and other election losers new opportunities to try to derail the democratic transition. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

### REGIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Little progress was made during the two rounds of talks on security issues in October and US Embassy reports indicate that the Contadora mediators are again increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for agreement. Nicaragua adopted a hard line, arguing that the mediators' most recent draft differed significantly from the September 1984 version, which it had accepted. Managua demanded that military maneuvers be proscribed and that formulas for arms reduction take into account its need to defend itself against all of its neighbors and the US. The Sandinistas again rejected talks with its armed opposition and insisted that the US must sign a protocol to respect an agreement. [redacted] 25X1

Core Four commitment to improving the draft is faltering, reinforced by the perception that Nicaragua will never sign a treaty. Costa Rica announced its willingness to sign the current draft with only minor modifications at the same time it 25X1

25X1

has been secretly exploring a bilateral accomodation with Managua. Guatemala remains on the sidelines and its only initiative was to gain postponement of the next session until 7 November, after its election. Honduras and El Salvador bore the burden of suggesting improvements to the security section of the draft, including continued foreign military maneuvers, parity in military force levels, and negotiation of arms limits before signature of the treaty. Nevertheless, Honduras--fearful that continued objections to the Contadora draft will give it an obstructionist image--told US officials that it has achieved 70 to 80 percent of what it wants and will agree to sign with only a few more modifications.

### NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILDUP

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#### **OCTOBER 1985**

26 September

Military camp at Nueva Guinea is being upgraded for additional barracks or open-air storage shed, according to photography from U-2 flights. Nearby facility previously thought to be agricultural cooperative appears to be military installation. Construction of large omni-directional radio transmitting antenna begun, and at least eight underground petroleum storage tanks with total capacity of some 112,640 gallons being installed.

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Photography reveals that grading operations for possible new construction is underway at Juigalpa in Chontales Department. Excavation from three underground petroleum storage tanks, with total capacity of over 42,000 gallons, also detected.

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Six-meter wide segment being added to each side of 45-meter wide runway at Sandino Airfield--possibly to counter erosion caused by heavy rains last May.

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4 October

5 October

6-7 October

8 October

11 October

two Soviet arms carriers arriving in Cut this week carrying air surveillance and fire control radars. Some or all of the radars may be transferred to Nicaragua.

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11 October

Aracely in port with Soviet arm

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[redacted]

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carrier that brought air defense radars and other military equipment from USSR. [redacted]

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14 October

Radio intercept and direction-finding site identified at the Cuajachillo Barracks in Managua that consists of eight-element circular Tall Rod antenna array. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] is to be installed at Masaya radar station complex, enabling Nicaraguan high command more secure communications. [redacted]

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[redacted]

25 October

Photography shows new area of some 10,000 square feet being cleared near pier in Puerto Cabezas for future equipment/vehicle park building. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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### SIGNIFICANT NICARAGUAN POLITICAL EVENTS

#### **October 1985**

1-3 October	Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference appoints Cardinal Obando y Bravo its president.	25X1
7-9 October & 17-19 October	Contadora and Central American vice foreign ministers meet in Panama.	25X1
11 October	Ecuadoran President Febres-Cordero breaks diplomatic relations with Managua after President Ortega calls Ecuador a "US puppet."	25X1
Mid-October	Cardinal Obando y Bravo forms Human Rights Commission under Church auspices to protest government repression and lack of basic necessities of life.	25X1
15 October	President Ortega expands national state of emergency, suspending many civil and political rights.	25X1
15 October	Nicaraguan Interior Ministry forces occupy Catholic Church curia offices, interrogate employees, and confiscate copies of new catholic Church newspaper, <u>Iglesia</u> .	25X1
18 October	Defense Minister Ortega announces males between 25 and 40 years will be called for service in the military reserves.	25X1
21 October	At the UN General Assembly, President Ortega challenges President Reagan to end US aggression in exchange for suspension of Sandinista state of emergency.	25X1


### NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY

In mid-October the Sandinistas expanded their three-year old state-of-emergency, suspending numerous civil liberties. At the same time, the regime stepped up harassment of dissidents. Meanwhile, the independent human rights organization in Nicaragua suffered internal difficulties that pose a serious threat to its effectiveness in monitoring abuses. The Catholic Church intends to fill the void with its own human rights organization.

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#### Alleged Insurgent Abuses

1 October	Sandinista press reports rebel troops kidnaped a civilian in Nueva Segovia.	25X1
1 October	Pro-regime press accuses insurgents in the far south of abusing residents near their safehavens in northern Costa Rica.	25X1




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3 October

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Pro-regime press reports that rebels abducted 20 farmers near Wiwili.




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9 October

Pro-Sandinista press reports that 18 farmers escaped from an insurgent camp in Honduras after suffering four months of forced labor.


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17 October

Pro-regime press carried the testimony of several youths, including a 12-year-old boy, who escaped rebel captivity. They attested to insurgent abuses and forced recruitments.


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17 to 23 October

In weekly summary of rebel atrocities, pro-regime press reports that the insurgents killed one civilian and kidnaped two others in Chontales, kidnaped three farmers near Boaco and two others in Jinotega.

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
Alleged Sandinista Abuses

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1 October

Rebel troops in the south publicly accused the Sandinistas of murdering 72 civilians, including women and children.


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2 October

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The US Embassy reports that the Peoples' Anti-Somocista Tribunals meted out stiff sentences



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to men convicted of anti-regime activities. The court, however, showed leniency in several cases as a way of improving its image. Also according to the US Embassy, the courts routinely convict 90 percent of those brought to trial and due process is almost totally ignored. [REDACTED]

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8 October

[REDACTED]  
essentially control both sides of the San Juan River that forms the boundary between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The source says they harass local farmers, stealing their cattle and firing on unarmed civilians with their helicopters. [REDACTED]

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12 October

The Permanent Commission on Human Rights reports that 10 independent labor leaders remain imprisoned for their union organizing activities. [REDACTED]

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16 October

Blaming the US support for the insurgency, President Ortega promulgates a decree significantly expanding the three-year old state-of-emergency. Under the provisions, 11 articles of the Sandinistas' original governing charter of 1979 are suspended, including: the right of habeas corpus, protection against search and seizure, and the right to freedom of assembly. Press censorship was also expanded, and new restrictions on internal travel were imposed. In the days following the decree, the regime stepped up pressure on dissidents. [REDACTED]

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21 October

[REDACTED]  
troops fired upon a house they believed occupied by rebels, killing four children and two adults. The troops refused to take responsibility and blamed the insurgents for the killings. [REDACTED]

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29 October

Vice-President Ramirez tells a group of visiting South American journalists that there are no political prisoners in Nicaraguan jails--the Permanent Commission on Human Rights claims there are 5,000. [REDACTED]

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31 October

International press service reports that the Sandinistas have decided to restore several of the legal rights suspended under the expanded state of emergency. The measure affects only criminal acts and does not apply to those accused of counterrevolutionary activity. [REDACTED]

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**NICARAGUAN TRIPS/VISITS****October 1985**

22 September	Vice Foreign Minister Tinoco travels to Mexico and Venezuela. [ ]	25X1
29 September	Foreign Minister D'Escoto and vice foreign minister Astorga visit New York for 40th UN General Assembly. [ ]	25X1
30 September	Trade union delegation concludes visit to Poland. [ ]	25X1
5 October	Vice President Ramirez returns to Nicaragua after meetings with President Betancur in Colombia and President Delvalle in Panama where he urged formation of commission to review presence of anti-Sandinista rebels in Honduras. [ ]	25X1
7 October- 15 October	Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe visits Nicaragua. [ ]	25X1
9 October	Vice President Ramirez visits Uruguay to solicit agricultural products and to discuss Contadora. [ ]	25X1
9 October	President Ortega meets with Mexican President de la Madrid during stop in Mexico City enroute to New York. [ ]	25X1
11 October	Ramirez visits Presidents of Peru and Argentina and expresses concern over US assistance to insurgents. [ ]	25X1
20-21 October	President Ortega attends UN General Assembly. [ ]	25X1

**COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING NOVEMBER**

3 November	National elections in Guatemala. [ ]	25X1
11 & 12 November	Contadora and Core Four meeting in Luxembourg with EC representatives. [ ]	25X1
9 November - 3 December	Nicaraguan Foreign Minister E'Escoto to travel to Luxembourg, Ireland, India, Australia, and Mexico. [ ]	25X1

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[Redacted]

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13 November -  
30 November

Nicaraguan vice foreign minister Astorga to travel  
to Luxembourg, Egypt, and Mexico. [Redacted]

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24 November

National elections in Honduras. [Redacted]

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CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #27


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	44 - 47 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07 <i>file 45-46 OCR 47-P&amp;PD</i>	
	48 - DDI/CPAS/ISS - 7G40	
	49 - CPAS/CDPB/CC - GH25	
	50 - DC/RIG/SOVA - 5E25	






















25X1



25X1

- 51 -  - C/LE/OCR - 1H39
- 52 - C/MCD
- 53 - DC/MCD
- 54 - C/CAN
- 55 - C/MX
- 56 - C/CAR
- 57 - C/CU
- 58 - C/CAS

25X1

- 59 - 
- 60 - 
- 61 - 
- 62 - 
- 63 - 
- 64 - 
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- 69 - 
- 70 - 
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- 73 - 
- 74 - 
- 75 - 
- 76 - 
- 77 - 
- 78 - 
- 79 - 
- 80 - MCD Files
- 81 - CAN Files
- 82 - CAS Files

25X1


DDI/ALA/MC/CAS



(1 November 1985)

25X1

25X1



25X1